Docket 24-5774
Barrett v. United States
DecidedJan 14, 2026
9-0unanimous decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court says one armed robbery death can yield only one gun-crime conviction, not two
What it does
The ruling holds that Congress did not clearly authorize two convictions for a single act that violates both §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j). It reverses the part of the Second Circuit's decision allowing both convictions to stand and sends the case back for resentencing with only one conviction on that pair of counts.
Who benefits
Defendants convicted of a firearm offense under §924(c)(1)(A)(i) where the same act also caused a death charged under §924(j), who can now face only one conviction and sentence for that single act instead of two stacked convictions.
Who is affected
Federal prosecutors, who must now choose between charging under §924(c)(1)(A)(i) or §924(j) for a single fatal act rather than securing both, and sentencing courts handling similar gun-crime cases nationwide.
Practical impact
Federal prosecutors handling cases where a firearm offense under §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and a resulting death under §924(j) arise from the same act must choose one charge to pursue for conviction purposes rather than obtaining both, though they may still charge both and let sentencing determine which stands. Defendants previously convicted and sentenced under both provisions for a single act may seek resentencing with only one conviction remaining, as happened for Barrett, who returns to the district court for another resentencing.
Majority reasoning
The Court applied the Blockburger presumption, under which Congress is presumed not to intend two convictions for the same offense unless it clearly says so. Because all parties agreed §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) define the same offense (the latter being a lesser-included situation of the former), the question was whether Congress plainly expressed intent to overcome that presumption. The majority found Congress knew how to write Blockburger-overcoming language, since it used "in addition to the punishment provided for" language elsewhere in §924(c) and (c)(5), but included no similar language linking subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j). The Court rejected the argument that subsection (c)'s consecutive-sentence mandate authorizes two convictions, explaining that the mandate only governs how sentences are arranged once two convictions already validly exist, not whether two convictions can exist in the first place. The Court also found that Lora v. United States already explained why subsection (j)'s flexible, non-mandatory sentencing scheme does not require added punishment layered on subsection (c) to preserve seriousness, and that legislative history further supported treating subsection (j) as an alternative rather than an addition to subsection (c).
Constitutional question
Whether a single act that violates both 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A)(i) (using a gun in a violent or drug crime) and §924(j) (causing death during that gun crime) can result in two separate convictions, or only one, and whether Congress clearly authorized stacking both.
Precedent changed
The Court did not overrule any precedent but relied on and extended reasoning from Lora v. United States (2023) and Ball v. United States (1985) to resolve a circuit split; it distinguished Garrett v. United States (1985) as inapplicable to this lesser-included-offense scenario.