Buckley v. Valeo

Majority reasoning

The per curiam opinion reasoned that contribution limits impose only a marginal restriction on speech because a contribution is a symbolic act of support, while the actual communication is performed by the candidate or committee that spends the money, so the government's interest in preventing corruption and its appearance justifies the modest burden. Expenditure limits, by contrast, directly restrict the quantity of political expression and association at its core, and the Court found no adequate government interest—corruption prevention does not extend to independent, uncoordinated spending, and "equalizing" political voices is not a legitimate basis for restricting speech under the First Amendment. The Court upheld disclosure requirements because they inform voters, deter corruption, and aid enforcement of contribution limits, outweighing the more modest associational burdens involved, while requiring case-by-case exemptions for groups that can show a reasonable probability of harassment. It upheld public financing as a valid exercise of the spending power to reduce dependence on large contributions, finding no unconstitutional discrimination against minor parties given their historically limited electoral success. Finally, the Court held that because the Commission's members exercise significant executive authority (rulemaking, civil enforcement, adjudication), they are "Officers of the United States" who must be appointed under the Appointments Clause by the President, courts, or department heads—not by leaders of Congress—so the Commission as constituted may perform only investigative and informative functions until reconstituted, with a 30-day stay to allow Congress to fix the appointment process.

Dissent reasoning

Chief Justice Burger dissented in part, arguing that contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin and that the Court's distinction between them "will not wash," since limiting contributions equally restricts political activity and association; he also found the $10 and $100 disclosure thresholds unconstitutionally low given inflation, and objected to public financing as an impermissible government intrusion into private political dialogue that risks entangling government with party affairs. Justice White dissented in part, arguing the Court should have upheld the expenditure limits, including on independent spending and candidate self-funding, because Congress reasonably concluded these provisions were necessary to prevent circumvention of contribution limits and to reduce candidates' dependence on fundraising; he contended money is not always equivalent to speech and that many campaign-related expenses are not communicative. Justice Marshall dissented in part from invalidating the personal-funds expenditure limit, reasoning that it promotes equal access to the political arena by preventing wealthy candidates from gaining an insurmountable head start, especially since contribution limits already disadvantage less-wealthy candidates who cannot rely on large gifts. Justice Blackmun dissented in part, stating he saw no principled distinction between contribution and expenditure limits and would have struck down or upheld both together. Justice Rehnquist dissented in part, arguing that Congress's scheme for public financing unconstitutionally entrenches the two major parties by giving them preferential treatment not justified by the weaker interests at stake compared to state ballot-access cases.