SCOTUS
Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co.
DecidedApr 14, 1873
5-4decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court upholds Louisiana's slaughterhouse monopoly law against 14th Amendment challenge
What it does
The ruling upholds a Louisiana statute granting a single corporation exclusive slaughterhouse rights across three parishes, finding it a valid exercise of the state's police power to protect public health. It establishes that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only a narrow set of rights tied to national citizenship, not the broader common-law rights of state citizenship, which remain under state control.
Who benefits
The Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company, which retains its exclusive monopoly, and state legislatures generally, which retain broad authority to regulate trades and grant exclusive business privileges under the police power.
Who is affected
The butchers of New Orleans and the three parishes, who must use the company's facilities and pay its fees rather than operate their own slaughterhouses, and more broadly anyone seeking federal court protection against state economic regulation under the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment.
Practical impact
The ruling severely limited the practical reach of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause as a tool for challenging state economic regulation, effectively rendering that clause a dead letter in later constitutional litigation. States retained broad authority under their police powers to grant monopolies and regulate trades and occupations, with federal courts largely unable to intervene under this clause, though litigants later shifted to Due Process and Equal Protection arguments to challenge similar state laws.
Majority reasoning
The majority, led by Justice Miller, reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment's history shows it was adopted primarily to secure the freedom and citizenship of formerly enslaved people, and its provisions must be read in that light. The Court held that the Amendment created a distinction between state and national citizenship, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only privileges of national citizenship (such as access to federal government, use of navigable waters, and protection abroad), not the broad common-law rights like the right to pursue a trade, which remain privileges of state citizenship protected only by state law. Adopting the plaintiffs' broader reading, the Court warned, would transfer control over nearly all civil rights from the states to the federal government and make the Supreme Court "a perpetual censor" over state legislation, a result Congress could not have intended. The Court found the law a legitimate police power regulation of a public health nuisance (slaughterhouses), noting it did not actually stop butchers from working, only required them to use the company's facilities for a fee. The majority also rejected the Due Process and Equal Protection claims, finding the restriction was not a "deprivation of property" and that Equal Protection was intended mainly to address racial discrimination against Black citizens, which was not present here.
Dissent reasoning
Justice Field, joined by the Chief Justice, Swayne, and Bradley, argued that the majority's narrow reading of "privileges and immunities" made the clause meaningless, since it would only protect rights already secure under the Constitution's supremacy, requiring no new amendment. He argued the fundamental right to pursue a lawful trade or calling free from arbitrary restraint is one of the privileges of American citizenship, tracing this to English common-law hostility toward monopolies and the Declaration of Independence's protection of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Field found the monopoly was not a genuine police regulation because the sanitary aims could be achieved without excluding all other butchers from an area of over 1,100 square miles, and he compared the restrictions to oppressive pre-revolutionary French feudal privileges. Justice Bradley, also dissenting, added that the right to choose one's calling is inherent in liberty itself, protected by Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to give federal courts power to enforce these fundamental rights against state infringement, rejecting fears that this would flood federal courts or destroy state governance. Justice Swayne, dissenting, argued that the Amendment's text was plain and unambiguous, applying to all citizens without limitation to race, and that the majority's narrow construction defeated the framers' intent to provide robust federal protection against state oppression, turning "what was meant for bread into a stone."
Constitutional question
Does a state law granting one corporation an exclusive 25-year monopoly over livestock landing and slaughtering in a large district violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments, particularly the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, or Equal Protection Clauses?