Docket 24-856
Cisco Systems Inc. v. Doe
DecidedJun 23, 2026
6-3decision
Source: CourtListener.
Supreme Court bars federal courts from creating new causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute
What it does
The Court held that federal courts have no authority to create new legal claims under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of international law, effectively closing off nearly all future ATS lawsuits beyond three historically recognized categories. The Court also held that the Torture Victim Protection Act does not allow lawsuits against people who assisted in torture but did not personally carry it out, because Congress never expressly included that form of liability in the statute's text. Together, these two holdings reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision and dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against Cisco Systems.
Who benefits
Companies and individuals accused of helping foreign governments commit human rights abuses abroad, who can no longer be sued in U.S. federal court under the Alien Tort Statute for those alleged acts of assistance.
Who is affected
Foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who allege they were harmed by violations of international law — such as torture, forced labor, or crimes against humanity — and who sought to hold American companies or individuals legally responsible in U.S. courts for enabling those violations.
Practical impact
Going forward, foreign nationals who suffer human rights abuses — including torture, forced labor, genocide, and crimes against humanity — will have no path to sue in U.S. federal court under the Alien Tort Statute unless their claim fits one of the three narrow historical categories recognized since the founding era (violations of safe conduct, harm to ambassadors, or piracy). American companies that provide technology, financing, or other services to foreign governments accused of human rights abuses can no longer face civil liability in U.S. courts under the ATS for that assistance. Victims who are U.S. citizens and seek to use the Torture Victim Protection Act must show that the defendant personally and directly carried out the torture, not merely that the defendant helped enable it.
Majority reasoning
The majority held that the Alien Tort Statute is purely a jurisdictional law — it gives courts the power to hear certain cases but does not itself create any right to sue. The Court reasoned that the power to create new legal claims belongs to Congress, not to courts, and that doing so in the ATS context is especially problematic because every such case touches on foreign policy, which is the domain of the political branches of government. The majority further reasoned that under the Court's modern approach to separation of powers, even a single good reason to think Congress might not want courts to create a new damages remedy is enough to stop courts from doing so — and in ATS cases, that reason always exists because international law cases inherently risk disrupting U.S. foreign relations. The Court also pointed to the Torture Victim Protection Act as evidence that Congress already created a targeted remedy in this area, which under current doctrine means courts should not layer on additional judge-made remedies. On the TVPA, the majority held that the statute's use of the word "subjects" — meaning to cause someone to undergo something — describes a direct causal link between the wrongdoer and the victim, and does not extend to people who merely assisted the torturer from a distance.
Dissent reasoning
Justice Sotomayor's dissent argued that the majority effectively overruled the Court's 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain without admitting it was doing so, and without applying the heightened standard the Court normally requires before reversing a statutory precedent. The dissent contended that Sosa was correctly decided: because Congress passed the ATS in 1789 expecting courts to apply the law of nations directly — without waiting for Congress to spell out every cause of action — courts have always had authority to recognize claims for well-established international law violations beyond the three historical examples. The dissent also argued that the majority's foreign-policy concerns were overstated, pointing out that both Congress and the Executive Branch had already publicly condemned China's treatment of Falun Gong members, meaning a private lawsuit against an American company was unlikely to meaningfully worsen U.S.-China relations. On the TVPA, the dissent argued that the word "subjects" is broad enough to cover someone who culpably participates in torture and helps make it succeed — such as a company that builds the surveillance system used to identify and arrest torture victims — and that the majority's demand for the specific words "aid and abet" imposes an unjustified "magic words" requirement that the Court has rejected in other contexts.
Constitutional question
May federal courts create new causes of action — that is, new legal grounds to sue — for violations of international law under the Alien Tort Statute? And does the Torture Victim Protection Act allow lawsuits against people who help others commit torture, even if they did not personally carry it out?
Precedent changed
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), which held that federal courts had narrow authority to recognize new causes of action under the ATS for sufficiently well-established international law norms, is effectively overruled — the Court closes the door Sosa left open, though the majority does not use the word "overruled" and leaves intact Sosa's holding that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute and its assumption that the three historical Blackstone categories remain actionable.