Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

Majority reasoning

The majority, per Justice Kennedy, held that political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because the speaker is a corporation, relying on Buckley v. Valeo and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti. It rejected Austin's "antidistortion" rationale—that corporations' wealth gives them unfair political influence—as inconsistent with the principle that government cannot restrict speech to equalize voices, and noted this rationale would let Congress ban speech even by media corporations or books. The Court also found the anticorruption interest insufficient because independent expenditures, uncoordinated with candidates, do not create the same risk of quid pro quo corruption as direct contributions, and rejected a shareholder-protection rationale as both underinclusive and overinclusive. The majority separately upheld BCRA's disclaimer and disclosure requirements, finding they serve an important informational interest and do not ban any speech. Responding to the dissent's argument that the case should have been decided narrowly, the majority explained that no valid narrower ground existed without either misreading the statute or leaving core First Amendment questions unresolved and speech chilled in the meantime.

Dissent reasoning

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, dissented from the Court's core holding (while joining the disclosure ruling). He argued the majority improperly transformed an abandoned facial challenge into a sweeping ruling never properly presented, violating principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis. He contended that corporations are not members of the political community, can be regulated differently from individuals under a century of precedent (from the 1907 Tillman Act onward), and that Austin's antidistortion rationale is really an anticorruption rationale addressing corporations' unique legal advantages, ability to draw on economic wealth unrelated to public support, and potential to create dependency relationships with officeholders that erode public trust. He also argued the shareholder-protection interest was substantial, since corporate general treasury spending forces shareholders to fund speech they may oppose, and warned the ruling would unleash unprecedented corporate and union spending in elections, including judicial elections. Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing the corporate-speech ban should fall but arguing the majority did not go far enough: he would have also struck down BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements as violating anonymous-speech rights, citing evidence that donors to causes like California's Proposition 8 campaign faced threats, harassment, and retaliation after their names were disclosed.