Clinton v. City of New York

Majority reasoning

The majority, led by Justice Stevens, held that the appellees had standing because they faced concrete financial injuries: New York and its hospitals faced revived multi-billion dollar contingent tax liabilities, and the potato growers' cooperative lost a statutory bargaining chip in negotiations to buy a processing plant. On the merits, the Court reasoned that when the President canceled provisions of the Balanced Budget Act and Taxpayer Relief Act, he in effect amended or repealed duly enacted statutes, producing laws different from the text that passed both Houses and was signed by the President. The Court distinguished Field v. Clark, explaining that historical tariff-suspension statutes required the President to act on a foreign-policy contingency that arose after enactment and to execute Congress's chosen policy, whereas here the President exercised discretion to reject Congress's policy judgment based on the same facts Congress already had. The majority also rejected the government's "lockbox" argument, noting that regardless of continuing budgetary effects, the canceled provisions were made entirely inoperative as to the specific parties. Because Article I's procedures for enacting and repealing laws are "finely wrought," the Court concluded that any change to this process must come through constitutional amendment, not ordinary legislation.

Dissent reasoning

Justice Breyer, joined in part by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, argued the Act does not literally violate the Constitution because the President's cancellation does not repeal or amend a law but simply executes a power Congress built into the statute itself, much like a delegated power of appointment among pre-specified alternatives. He contended the Act reflects a constitutionally proper effort to adapt lawmaking to a vastly larger modern government and budget, and that separation-of-powers principles should be read pragmatically to favor workable government. Breyer found the delegated power was executive in nature, did not encroach on Congress's authority since Congress retained the power to exempt provisions or override cancellations by simple majority, and satisfied the nondelegation doctrine because the Act's standards were no vaguer than other delegations the Court has upheld, such as broadcast licensing standards. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor and partly by Breyer, dissented in part, arguing that the Snake River cooperative lacked standing because its claimed injury was speculative, resting on unproven negotiations rather than a demonstrated loss of any actual bargain. Scalia also argued that the New York cancellation was constitutional, contending the "cancel" power was functionally identical to longstanding statutory practices allowing Presidents discretion not to spend appropriated funds, and that the real constitutional question was one of nondelegation, not the Presentment Clause, since the cancellation power was itself created and defined within a law that Congress passed through the proper Article I process.