FCC v. Consumers' Research

Majority reasoning

The majority held that the same "intelligible principle" test used for all congressional delegations applies here too, rejecting the argument that revenue-raising statutes need a special rule requiring a numeric tax rate or cap—precedent in J.W. Hampton and Skinner already rejected that special rule. It reasoned that the statutory word "sufficient" sets both a floor and ceiling on what the FCC can collect, and that Section 254 gives the FCC detailed, mandatory criteria (essential, affordable, widely-subscribed services for specified beneficiaries) that meaningfully constrain its discretion. The Court also rejected the private-delegation challenge because the private administrator only makes recommendations while the FCC retains final approval authority, consistent with Sunshine Anthracite Coal. Finally, the majority rejected the Fifth Circuit's theory that two independently permissible delegations could "combine" into an unconstitutional one, distinguishing Free Enterprise Fund because that case involved two restraints operating on the same axis (presidential removal power), whereas public and private nondelegation doctrines operate on different axes. The majority also responded directly to the dissent's tax/fee distinction argument, noting in footnotes that Skinner made the tax-versus-fee inquiry irrelevant to nondelegation analysis and that attempts to distinguish the fee examples from universal-service contributions collapse under scrutiny.

Dissent reasoning

Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, argued that universal-service contributions are taxes, and that historically Congress has never delegated the power to set a domestic tax rate to an agency without setting the rate itself or a numeric cap—something Section 254 lacks entirely. The dissent contended that the statute's "qualitative" criteria are toothless because the FCC treats them as things to merely "consider" rather than binding requirements, pointing to the fund's near-doubling in real terms and the contribution factor's rise from under 4% to nearly 37% as proof the constraints don't actually limit the agency. The dissent also argued the majority's comparisons to fee-based statutes (like FDIC assessments) are inapt because fees compensate for a specific cost or benefit to the payor, whereas universal-service contributions redistribute money from carriers to other beneficiaries just like a tax. Gorsuch further criticized the majority for essentially rewriting the statute to make its four criteria mandatory rather than merely things to "consider," calling this an unauthorized judicial fix that itself concedes the original statute was constitutionally deficient, and noted the majority conspicuously declined to defend two provisions (Sections 254(c)(3) and (h)(2)) that lack even this qualitative limit.