Docket 24-781
First Choice Womens Resource Centers Inc. v. Davenport
DecidedApr 29, 2026
9-0unanimous decision
Source: CourtListener.
Nonprofit can sue in federal court to block state AG's demand for private donor records
What it does
The Court held that a government subpoena demanding a nonprofit's private donor information causes an immediate, ongoing injury to the group's First Amendment right of association the moment it is issued — not only after a court orders compliance. This means the nonprofit does not have to wait for a state court to enforce the subpoena before it can challenge the demand in federal court. The ruling also confirms that a government promise to keep disclosed donor information confidential does not eliminate the First Amendment injury caused by the demand itself.
Who benefits
Nonprofit organizations, advocacy groups, charities, and membership associations that receive government subpoenas or investigatory demands seeking the identities of their private donors or members. These groups can now immediately challenge such demands in federal court under 42 U.S.C. §1983 without first exhausting state court proceedings.
Who is affected
State attorneys general and other state officials who use subpoenas or investigatory demands to seek donor or membership records from nonprofit organizations engaged in protected advocacy. Such officials now face immediate federal court challenges to those demands before any state court enforces them.
Practical impact
Nonprofit organizations that receive government subpoenas demanding donor or member information can immediately file suit in federal court under §1983 to challenge those demands on First Amendment grounds, without waiting for state court enforcement proceedings to conclude. State officials who issue such subpoenas should expect prompt federal litigation and cannot defeat standing by arguing the subpoena is not yet court-enforced, by carving out a narrow exempt donation channel, or by promising to keep records confidential. Lower courts must now allow these cases to proceed to the merits — where the government must satisfy heightened First Amendment scrutiny to justify the demand.
Majority reasoning
The Court reasoned that the First Amendment's protection of free speech, assembly, and petition necessarily includes the right to associate with others, and that this right is especially important for minority, religious, and dissenting groups. The majority held that government demands for a charity's private donor information inevitably discourage people from associating with the targeted group and pressure the group itself to scale back protected advocacy — and that this chilling effect begins the moment the demand is made, not only when a court enforces it. The Court found that it did not matter whether the subpoena was "non-self-executing" (meaning it required a separate court order to be legally binding), because a reasonable donor would still fear disclosure and a reasonable organization would still feel pressure to change its behavior as soon as the demand arrived. The majority also rejected the argument that leaving one narrow donation channel exempt from the subpoena eliminated the injury, reasoning that the government cannot avoid First Amendment scrutiny by channeling disfavored groups into only state-approved forms of association. Finally, the Court held that a government promise to keep disclosed donor records confidential does not cure the injury, because even disclosure only to government officials — with no public release — is enough to deter association and suppress dissenting expression.
Constitutional question
Does a nonprofit organization suffer a concrete, present injury to its First Amendment right of association — sufficient to bring a federal lawsuit — when a state attorney general issues a subpoena demanding the names, addresses, phone numbers, and employers of the organization's private donors?
Precedent changed
The ruling extends and applies Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595 (2021), and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), to the standing context, confirming that the chilling effect those cases recognized on the merits also constitutes a present, concrete injury for Article III purposes. The Court distinguished but did not overrule Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), and FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 160 (1927), limiting those cases to their equity-practice context and to plaintiffs who alleged no present injury from the subpoena itself.