Grutter v. Bollinger

Majority reasoning

The majority, following Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, held that a university's educational judgment that diversity is essential to its mission deserves deference, and that obtaining the educational benefits of a diverse student body is a compelling interest grounded partly in a First Amendment tradition of academic freedom. The Court found the Law School's policy narrowly tailored because it uses race flexibly as a "plus" factor within individualized, holistic review of each applicant, rather than through quotas, separate tracks, or insulation from competition, and because the school gives substantial weight to many other diversity factors. The majority rejected the argument that the school must exhaust every race-neutral alternative, holding instead that it need only give serious, good-faith consideration to workable alternatives, and found options like lotteries or lowered standards would sacrifice academic quality or other diversity too much. The Court also required that race-conscious admissions programs have a logical end point, expressing an expectation that racial preferences would no longer be needed in 25 years. Responding to the dissent's claim that fluctuating minority enrollment numbers show a hidden quota, the majority pointed out that enrollment percentages diverged substantially from applicant-pool percentages and varied by group and year, which it said was inconsistent with a quota.

Dissent reasoning

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, argued that the Law School's "critical mass" justification does not match its actual practice, pointing to data showing that admission rates for Hispanics and Native Americans were far lower relative to African-Americans given similar credentials, with no race-specific explanation offered. He argued the close year-to-year correlation between the percentage of each racial group in the applicant pool and in the admitted class shows careful racial engineering amounting to unconstitutional racial balancing, not genuine attention to diversity, and that the program lacks any real time limit. Justice Kennedy, dissenting separately, agreed that strict scrutiny requires genuine judicial review of methods, not just deference to the school's stated goal, and argued the majority abandoned real scrutiny by accepting the school's assurances without demanding proof that individualized review survived in the competitive final stages of admissions, where race became effectively outcome-determinative for many minority applicants. Justice Thomas, joined in part by Justice Scalia, argued that the school's asserted interest is really about preserving its elite status rather than any compelling public necessity, that the Constitution should be treated as color-blind now rather than in 25 years, and that racial preferences may stigmatize even qualified minority students and fail to address the LSAT performance gap. Justice Scalia, also joined by Thomas, argued the "critical mass" concept is a sham covering proportional racial admissions and predicted the decision would generate prolonged litigation over its vague standards.