Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents

Majority reasoning

The Court held that the ADEA's text, incorporating the Fair Labor Standards Act's enforcement provisions, clearly and unmistakably expressed Congress's intent to let individuals sue states for damages. But under the Eleventh Amendment and the Court's precedent in Seminole Tribe, Congress cannot use its Article I Commerce Clause power to strip states of sovereign immunity; only Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can do that, and only through legislation that is "congruent and proportional" to actual constitutional violations. The majority found that age is not a suspect classification, so state age discrimination need only pass a lenient rational-basis test under the Equal Protection Clause, whereas the ADEA imposes a much stricter standard resembling heightened scrutiny. Because Congress's own legislative record showed almost no evidence that states were engaging in unconstitutional age discrimination, the majority concluded the ADEA's sweeping prohibition on state employment practices was disproportionate to any actual constitutional problem, making it an invalid exercise of Section 5 power. The Court directly responded to Justice Thomas's clarity objections, explaining that Congress's simultaneous 1974 amendments to both the FLSA enforcement provision and the ADEA itself showed Congress understood the consequences of its actions, and rejected his reading of which portions of the FLSA provision were incorporated.

Dissent reasoning

Justice Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the Court's holding that Congress lacks Article I power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, arguing that Congress's power to regulate the labor market covers both public and private employers equally and that nothing in the constitutional text supports using judge-made sovereign immunity doctrine to block private suits Congress has authorized. He argued the Framers relied on structural safeguards—equal state representation in the Senate and the design of the House and Presidency—rather than the judiciary, to protect state interests from federal overreach, so courts should not second-guess Congress's balancing of state and federal interests once it speaks clearly. He argued Seminole Tribe was wrongly decided and should not be treated as binding precedent, since it lacks the kind of reliance interests that normally justify following prior rulings, and that the Eleventh Amendment's text limits only the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts rather than barring federal-question suits like this one. Justice Thomas, joined by Kennedy, agreed the ADEA's abrogation was not appropriate legislation under Section 5, but dissented in part from the majority's finding that Congress's clear-statement requirement was satisfied, arguing that the ADEA's own enforcement provision and the incorporated FLSA provision, given their disconnected legislative history and ambiguous language, did not unmistakably show Congress meant to expose states to suit in federal court.