Docket 24-109
Louisiana v. Callais
DecidedApr 29, 2026
6-3decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court raises the bar for Voting Rights Act claims, striking down Louisiana's second majority-Black district
What it does
The Court holds that compliance with Section 2 can be a compelling interest justifying race-based districting, but only when Section 2 is read narrowly to require strong evidence of intentional discrimination rather than mere unequal outcomes. It rewrites the decades-old Gingles framework for proving vote-dilution claims, adding requirements that plaintiffs' alternative maps use no race and match all the state's non-racial goals (including partisan goals), and that evidence of racial bloc voting control for party affiliation. Applying this new framework, the Court finds Louisiana did not need to draw a second majority-Black district, so that district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
Who benefits
State legislatures seeking to draw congressional and legislative districts, including for partisan advantage, without being constrained by Voting Rights Act claims; incumbent officeholders whose seats were protected by the challenged map.
Who is affected
Black and other minority voters in states with racially polarized voting, who will find it much harder to win Section 2 vote-dilution lawsuits and may see existing majority-minority districts eliminated in future redistricting.
Practical impact
States can now more easily defend redistricting plans against Section 2 vote-dilution claims by asserting partisan or other race-neutral goals, since plaintiffs must produce alternative maps matching those goals exactly while using no racial data. Existing majority-minority districts across the country, including in the South, become more vulnerable to being dismantled in future redistricting, and future Section 2 lawsuits alleging vote dilution face substantially higher evidentiary hurdles.
Majority — Alito
Joined by: Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett
The majority reasoned that the Constitution almost never permits racial discrimination by government, and only two interests have ever been found compelling enough to justify it: prison safety and remedying specific identified past discrimination. Because the Fifteenth Amendment itself only bars intentional discrimination, Congress's power to enforce it through Section 2 must be read to target intentional discrimination too, not mere statistical disparities, or else Congress would be improperly changing the right rather than enforcing it. The majority found that since Gingles was decided 40 years ago, conditions have changed dramatically—less discrimination, a real two-party system, the Rucho decision barring partisan gerrymandering suits, and powerful mapping software—making it easy for plaintiffs to exploit race-based claims to mask partisan disputes. It therefore updated the Gingles test to require plaintiffs to disentangle race from politics at every step, and concluded Louisiana's Robinson plaintiffs failed to show the state was constitutionally required to draw a second majority-Black district, so the map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Responding to the dissent's charge that this effectively imports an intent requirement, the majority insisted it only requires "a strong inference" of intentional discrimination arising from circumstances, not direct proof, and denied overruling Allen v. Milligan because that case did not involve a state defending its map on partisan grounds.
Dissent reasoning
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, argued that Congress deliberately rejected an intent requirement when it amended Section 2 in 1982 to overturn Mobile v. Bolden, replacing it with a results-based test asking only whether minority voters have less opportunity to elect their preferred candidates. The dissent argued the majority's new "Callais requirements"—that plaintiffs' illustrative maps must be race-blind and match every state political goal, and that racial bloc voting evidence must control for party—will make Section 2 claims nearly impossible to win wherever race and party correlate, which is almost everywhere Section 2 currently applies, effectively reviving Bolden's discarded intent test. The dissent contended this violates statutory stare decisis, since the Court in Allen v. Milligan just three years earlier reaffirmed the Gingles framework with "superpowered" precedential force and rejected similar arguments from Alabama. Kagan warned the ruling could unravel Louisiana's older majority-Black district and similar districts nationwide, producing the largest reduction in minority representation since Reconstruction, and framed the decision as the final step in a series of rulings (Shelby County, Brnovich) dismantling the Voting Rights Act's protections.
Constitutional question
Can a state's compliance with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act count as a "compelling interest" that justifies intentionally drawing a congressional district based on race, and if so, what must be proven to show Section 2 actually requires such a district?
Precedent changed
The majority updates and narrows the Thornburg v. Gingles framework for proving Section 2 vote-dilution claims, adding new requirements not previously imposed, while declining to formally overrule Allen v. Milligan.