Mahmoud v. Taylor

Majority — Alito

Joined by: Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett

The majority, led by Justice Alito, held that the Free Exercise Clause protects parents' right to direct the religious upbringing of their children, a right recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, which is violated by policies that pose a "very real threat of undermining" parents' religious beliefs. The storybooks, the Court found, are "unmistakably normative," presenting views on same-sex marriage and gender identity as things to be celebrated while implying that contrary religious views are hurtful or hateful, thereby exerting pressure on young children to conform. The Court rejected the Board's characterization of this as mere "exposure," noting the Board's own guidance encouraged teachers to reinforce these viewpoints and reprimand disagreeing students, and rejected the Board's reliance on Bowen v. Roy and Lyng because those cases involved government "internal affairs," not direct coercive interactions with schoolchildren. Applying strict scrutiny because the burden matched the character of that in Yoder, the majority found the Board's asserted interest in avoiding classroom disruption insufficient because the Board already permits opt-outs in numerous other contexts, undermining its claim that opt-outs here were unworkable. The majority also directly answered the dissent's reliance on Bowen and Lyng by distinguishing those cases as involving the government's internal management of its own programs rather than coercive interactions between the state and children in classrooms.

Dissent reasoning

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that the Free Exercise Clause under longstanding precedent (Bowen, Lyng, Barnette, Smith) only prohibits government from directly or indirectly coercing individuals to violate or abandon their religious beliefs, and that mere exposure to ideas conflicting with one's faith is not enough to trigger a constitutional violation. The dissent argued the majority misreads Yoder, which turned on the Wisconsin law's affirmative compulsion of Amish parents to send children away in violation of their religion, not merely on a "very real threat of undermining" religious belief, and noted that this Court's decision in Lyng expressly rejected that broader reading. The dissent warned that the majority's vague, subjective "very real threat" test has no limiting principle and could apply to countless topics—evolution, women's achievements, interfaith marriage—creating impossible administrative burdens for school districts and likely leading schools to strip curricula of any content that might provoke religious objection. The dissent also faulted the majority for reaching an issue beyond the question presented (whether the burden survives strict scrutiny) and for misapplying strict scrutiny by assuming, without expertise in school administration, that the Board could simply create a discrete unit for the storybooks to ease opt-out administration.