Docket 210
Plessy v. Ferguson
DecidedMay 18, 1896
7-1decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court upholds state law requiring racially separate railroad cars for Black and white passengers
What it does
The ruling upholds a Louisiana law requiring railroads to provide "equal but separate" train cars for white and Black passengers, and allows criminal penalties for passengers who sit in a car not assigned to their race. It establishes that government-mandated racial separation in public facilities does not violate constitutional equal protection guarantees as long as the separate facilities are considered equal.
Who benefits
State legislatures seeking to enact racial segregation laws for public accommodations and transportation, and railroad companies operating under such state mandates gain clear legal authority to enforce race-based seating.
Who is affected
Black train passengers in Louisiana and other states, who can now be legally required to ride in separate cars from white passengers and face fines or imprisonment for refusing to comply; more broadly, this affects all Black citizens in states that later pass similar segregation laws for schools, theaters, and other public facilities.
Practical impact
The ruling gave constitutional cover to state and local governments to enact "separate but equal" laws mandating racial segregation across trains, schools, restaurants, theaters, and other public facilities for the following decades. It became the legal foundation for the Jim Crow system of segregation throughout the Southern United States until it was overturned in the mid-20th century.
Majority reasoning
The majority held that the Thirteenth Amendment only abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, and a law requiring separate but equal accommodations does not create a state of bondage or servitude. On the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority reasoned that its purpose was to establish legal and political equality between the races, but not to force "social equality" or a "commingling of the two races" that is unsatisfactory to either. The Court pointed to widely accepted laws creating separate schools for Black and white children as proof that government-mandated separation of races does not by itself imply inferiority of either race. The majority further reasoned that if separation makes Black passengers feel inferior, "it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it." Finally, the Court found the Louisiana law a "reasonable" exercise of state police power because legislatures may act with reference to "established usages, customs and traditions" and public order, and reasoned that law cannot alone create social equality between races.
Dissent reasoning
Justice Harlan argued that the Constitution is "color-blind" and does not permit any government to classify citizens by race when their civil rights are at stake. He contended the real purpose of the law was not neutral but was designed specifically to exclude Black passengers from cars used by white passengers, and that this amounted to a "badge of servitude" prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Harlan warned that the same reasoning used to justify separate train cars could be extended to justify segregating streets, courtrooms, and juries, undermining the equal citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He rejected the majority's "reasonableness" framework, arguing courts should not evaluate the wisdom of legislation once its constitutionality is established, but here found the statute unconstitutional on its face because it interfered with citizens' personal liberty to travel freely regardless of race. He predicted the ruling would prove "quite as pernicious" as the Dred Scott decision and would encourage further discriminatory state laws and racial hostility, rather than promoting racial harmony.
Constitutional question
Does a state law requiring railroads to provide separate railway cars for white and Black passengers violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments?