SCOTUS
Trump v. Slaughter
DecidedJun 29, 2026
6-3decision
Source: CourtListener.
Court lets the President fire FTC commissioners at will, overturning 90-year-old removal protections
What it does
The ruling holds that the FTC's statutory protection against removal without cause violates the separation of powers, because the FTC exercises executive power and its leaders must therefore answer directly to the President. It overrules Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935), the decades-old precedent that had allowed such protections for the FTC and similar agencies.
Who benefits
The President and future administrations gain expanded power to remove heads of multi-member regulatory agencies without needing to show cause, increasing direct presidential control over agency policy.
Who is affected
FTC commissioners and, potentially, leaders of dozens of other independent agencies (such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and others) who previously enjoyed for-cause removal protection now face removal at the President's discretion.
Practical impact
Going forward, the President can remove FTC commissioners for any reason, and the ruling casts serious doubt on removal protections for numerous other independent agencies with similar for-cause structures. Agencies that previously operated with insulation from direct presidential control may see faster leadership turnover tied to changes in administration, and future litigation will likely test how far this rule extends to inferior officers, adjudicatory bodies, and agencies like the Federal Reserve, which the majority suggested may remain an exception.
Majority — Roberts
Joined by: Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Thomas
The majority reasoned that the Constitution vests all executive power in a single President, who must be able to remove subordinates who exercise that power in order to remain accountable and fulfill his duty to faithfully execute the laws. It traced this principle through the Constitutional Convention's rejection of a plural executive, the First Congress's "Decision of 1789," and a line of cases including Myers v. United States, concluding that Humphrey's Executor's carve-out for "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" agencies never had a coherent rationale and has been undermined by later cases like Morrison v. Olson, Free Enterprise Fund, and Seila Law. Because the FTC today writes binding rules, investigates and prosecutes violations, and sues in federal court—functions the majority called core executive power—it must be controlled by the President. On the dissent's reliance argument, the majority responded that Congress's reliance on Humphrey's to insulate agencies from the President was not a "legitimate" reliance interest, because insulating agencies from the President simply shifts power to Congress rather than achieving true independence.
Dissent reasoning
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued that Humphrey's Executor was correctly decided and has been repeatedly reaffirmed, including in Morrison, Free Enterprise Fund, and Seila Law, making this "a profoundly easy case" under stare decisis. The dissent contended that the constitutional text is silent on removal, that founding-era practice (including the Sinking Fund Commission, the Mint Board, and the First and Second Banks of the United States) shows Congress could and did create agencies with partial independence, and that 140 years of consistent practice by Congress and more than a dozen Presidents relied on the principle that multimember commissions like the FTC could have for-cause protection. The dissent warned that overturning Humphrey's ignores massive reliance interests, destabilizes dozens of federal agencies overseeing energy, consumer safety, nuclear power, and the civil service, and hands the President unprecedented concentrated power over lawmaking-like and adjudicatory functions that Congress deliberately kept at arm's length from politics.
Constitutional question
Does the Constitution's separation of powers allow Congress to protect Federal Trade Commission members from being fired by the President except for cause, or must the President be able to remove them at will?
Precedent changed
Overrules Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935), which had upheld for-cause removal protections for FTC commissioners; also clarifies that Morrison v. Olson, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, and Seila Law v. CFPB are consistent with today's holding rather than independently protective of multimember agency removal restrictions.