Trump v. United States

Majority reasoning

The Court reasoned that the Constitution's separation of powers requires that a president be able to exercise core constitutional authority without fear of later criminal prosecution, because Congress cannot regulate and courts cannot review the exercise of powers that are "conclusive and preclusive" under Article II. Beyond that core, the Court held that criminal prosecution poses a greater threat of chilling bold presidential decisionmaking than civil liability does, so at least presumptive immunity is needed for all official acts, rebuttable only if prosecuting would pose no danger of intrusion on executive authority. The Court found no immunity applies to unofficial acts, and drew on Nixon v. Fitzgerald's civil immunity framework, the Nixon tapes case, and the Burr case as guidance. Responding to the dissent's charge that this places the president above the law, the majority answered that criminal statutes still apply to unofficial conduct and that the ruling instead preserves the constitutional structure that gives the presidency independence, arguing the greater danger is a cycle where each successive administration prosecutes its predecessor.

Dissent reasoning

Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, argued the majority invented an atextual and ahistorical immunity unsupported by the Constitution's text, which provides no such shield and, through the Impeachment Judgment Clause, actually contemplates that former presidents can be criminally prosecuted. She argued that historical evidence, including Hamilton's Federalist writings and the Nixon pardon episode, shows presidents were always understood to be subject to ordinary criminal law, and that the majority's balancing test misapplies Fitzgerald by ignoring the much greater public interest in criminal accountability compared to civil damages suits. She warned the ruling effectively immunizes even assassination of political rivals or a bribery-for-pardon scheme if accomplished through official power, and objected to the majority's rule barring use of official-acts evidence even in prosecutions of unofficial conduct. Justice Jackson, writing separately, agreed with all of Sotomayor's reasoning and further argued that the majority replaced the traditional "individual accountability model," under which everyone including the president is bound by generally applicable criminal law subject to ordinary defenses, with a new "Presidential accountability model" that treats the president as exempt from the law itself depending on judicially-drawn categories. She argued this shift aggrandizes the courts' and the presidency's power at Congress's expense, provides no administrable standard for distinguishing core, official, and unofficial conduct, and removes the deterrent effect of criminal law on presidential wrongdoing.