SCOTUS
Watson v. Republican National Committee
DecidedJun 29, 2026
5-4decision
Source: CourtListener.
Federal election-day laws do not require absentee ballots to be received by Election Day
What it does
The Court held that federal election-day statutes set the deadline for when voters must cast their ballots, not when those ballots must be received by election officials. Mississippi's law allowing absentee ballots postmarked by Election Day to be counted if received within five business days after Election Day is not preempted by federal law. States retain the authority under federal law to set their own deadlines for when absentee ballots must arrive.
Who benefits
Absentee voters in states that allow ballots postmarked by Election Day to arrive after Election Day, including college students away from home, senior citizens, and others who vote by mail. State governments that have enacted or wish to enact post-Election Day ballot receipt windows.
Who is affected
Plaintiffs who sought to enforce a uniform Election Day ballot-receipt deadline, including political party organizations that brought the lawsuit. State and local election officials in roughly 30 states who count late-arriving mail ballots now have clearer legal footing to continue that practice.
Practical impact
The approximately 30 states that currently count absentee ballots postmarked by Election Day but received afterward may continue to do so without those laws being struck down as preempted by federal election-day statutes. Absentee voters in those states who mail their ballots on or before Election Day can have their votes counted even if the ballot arrives days later. The ruling does not resolve related questions — such as how many days after Election Day a state may accept ballots, or whether voters may recall mailed ballots — leaving those issues for future litigation or legislative action.
Majority reasoning
The majority held that the word "election" in the federal election-day statutes means the act of the electorate making its choice — that is, the act of voting — not the act of officials receiving ballots. The Court reasoned that dictionaries from the time the statutes were enacted consistently defined "election" as "the act of choosing a person to fill an office," and that the choice is complete when voters cast their ballots, not when ballots arrive at an election office. The majority also pointed to a related federal law, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which repeatedly treats ballot-receipt deadlines as a matter of state law — a structure that would make little sense if the election-day statutes already imposed a nationwide receipt deadline. The Court further noted that the Constitution itself separates the day of voting from the day of receipt in the Electoral College system, where electors vote on a uniform day but their ballots are transmitted and received later. Finally, the majority rejected the plaintiffs' historical, precedent-based, and policy arguments, finding that 19th-century voting practices do not automatically become frozen requirements of 19th-century statutes, that the key precedent (Foster v. Love) addressed a different question and did not mention ballot receipt, and that concerns about election integrity are properly addressed by legislatures, not courts.
Dissent reasoning
The dissent argued that an "election" is not complete — and the electorate's choice is not authoritatively made — until all ballots have been collected by election officials, not merely cast by individual voters. Justice Alito reasoned that because the electorate is a collective body, its choice is only expressed when the full set of ballots is in officials' hands; adding ballots received after Election Day effectively postpones the date of the election in violation of federal law. The dissent pointed to legal dictionaries from the era of the statutes' enactment that described an "election" as including both the casting and receiving of ballots, and to state court decisions holding that a vote is not complete until an official takes custody of the ballot. The dissent also argued that two centuries of unbroken historical practice — including Civil War-era states that went to great lengths to collect soldiers' ballots by Election Day even under difficult conditions — shows that "election day" was universally understood to mean ballot-collection day. The dissent further contended that the majority's reading of Foster v. Love contradicts that case's holding that an "election" requires the "combined actions of voters and officials," since under the majority's rule officials need not act until days after Election Day. Finally, the dissent warned that the ruling opens unresolved questions about how late ballots can arrive, what intermediaries may deliver them, and whether voters can recall mailed ballots before delivery, while also increasing opportunities for fraud and eroding public confidence in election results.
Constitutional question
Do the federal election-day statutes — which set the Tuesday in November as the day for electing Representatives, Senators, and the President — require that absentee ballots be received by election officials on or before Election Day, thereby preventing states from counting ballots postmarked by Election Day but received afterward?
Precedent changed
The Court narrowed the scope of Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997), clarifying that its definition of "election" as the "combined actions of voters and officials" does not require ballot receipt to occur on Election Day and that Foster addressed only whether an election could be concluded before Election Day, not when ballots must be received.